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ABSTRACT 
Some recent studies have shown the outstanding price linkages at the global scale between the cannery-
grade tuna markets over the last decade. When it comes to price transmission along the European value 
chains, opposite results between the two major species (skipjack and yellowfin) are found: the market for 
final  goods  is  actually  segmented  between  the  northern  European  countries  consuming  low-priced 
skipjack imported from Asia and the southern countries producing and importing yellowfin sold on their 
domestic markets at higher prices. If the former market is supposedly competitive, there is more suspicion 
of market power exercised on the latter. Through a structural and dynamic I.O. model already tested for 
other species in previous research, this paper explores the possible existence of market power exercised 
either by processors on the one hand (canned tuna sold in France) and/or by retailers on the other (French 
supermarkets). Some explanations are given in terms of industrial concentration for both processing and 
retailing industries and the marketing organisation itself. The high level of trade barriers protecting the 
European industry may also serve as a determining factor.  
Keywords: canned tuna market, concentration, market power 
 
1. Introduction: the limits to tuna markets integration  
In a previous research (Jimenez-Toribio et al., 2007), we have tested for price relationships between the 
European and the world markets both horizontally (spatial linkages at the ex-vessel and the ex-cannery 
levels) and vertically (price transmission). First of all, a very high degree of market integration was found 
on the first-hand market (frozen tuna) at the world-wide level for the two major species (skipjack and 
yellowfin) used by the canning industry. Some of the processors are big multinational firms comparing in 
real time ex-vessel prices on a limited number of market places (Thailand, Ecuador, American Samoa, 
Japan,  Italy,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Spain).  These  results  are  in  line  with  other  attempts  of  looking  at  price 
linkages between tuna markets (Jeon et al. 2008, Squires et al. 2006), except that they go further by 
showing a linkage between the two species that was never found previously. 
But  as  regards  canned  tuna  products,  the  European  market  is  dual.  The  skipjack  in  oil  or  brine, 
conventionally consumed in the North European countries, offers a clear picture of competitive market 
ruled by imports from Thailand that are able to jump over the 24% custom tariff. This result is consistent 
with other studies showing through an AIDS model for canned tuna in the UK for instance the good (and 
negative) response of expenditure to prices between different product medium (brine, sauce, oil) (Jaffry 
and Brown, 2005; Josupeit 1993). Moreover, the US demand has probably the greatest influence on 
global  markets  through  their  huge  imports  from  Asian  countries,  thus  creating  a  linkage  with  the 
European market also importing from this important source of supply. As far as the canned yellowfin is 
concerned, all horizontal and vertical price relationships estimated at the final stages of the marketing IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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chain  gave  opposite  conclusions:  no  co-movements  in  the  long  run,  no  causality  and  a  rather  bad 
transmission of price changes, except on the ex-vessel market segment. These results lead to a suspicion 
of market power for yellowfin tuna products consumed in Europe. 
A  long  time  ago,  industrial  organisation  scientists  found  an  origin  of  market  power  in  the  level  of 
concentration reached by an industry. Actually, the European markets for canned tuna are now dominated 
by  a  handful  of  powerful  traders,  processors  and  retailers.  In  the  second  section,  the  degree  of 
concentration of the European canned tuna industry is thus estimated, before looking at gross margins as a 
proxy of the Lerner index which raises suspicions of market power in this industry. In a third section, a 
dynamic structural model inspired by Steen and Salvanes (1999) is developed and tested on the French 
market  for  canned  yellowfin  in  brine  (quarterly  data  between  1995  and  2006).  The  results  provide 
evidence of market power after a breakpoint in 1998, date of several events (ENSO effects, low prices of 
frozen  tuna,  devaluation  of  the  Thailandese  Baht,  increasing  quantity  of  tuna  loins  processed  by 
canneries…). In the fourth and last section, the consequences of this market power are discussed in terms 
of fisheries management and tuna trade. 
 
 
2. Concentration of the European canned tuna market: evidence from structural data 
Increasing returns to scale and intra-industry trade of tuna products 
A market power is likely to occur in an industry dominated by a few big enterprises which are able to 
reinforce market imperfections (entry barriers, economies of scale) through a wide range of rival-oriented 
strategies (warfare, entry deterrence, price discrimination, raising rivals’ costs...). Since the very inception 
of the tuna industry nearly two centuries ago in Europe, most of the comparative advantages in the canned 
fish trade have been based on the closeness of fisheries (sardines, and then tuna) and low labour costs. 
With the growing  market share of  tropical  tuna  in the global  market of these products, comparative 
advantages are now more rooted in increasing returns to scale than anything else. As an example, the 
French industry, which pioneered the world fish canning industry and exported 70% of it output to the 
USA  until  the  mid-19th  century  to  supply  the  gold  rush  (Guillotreau  and  Ferreira  Dias  2005),  has 
experienced a huge decrease in the number of canneries since World War II. Not only most of the plants 
were settled in the former African colonies after the discovery of the tropical tuna stocks in the Atlantic 
Ocean, but the remaining canneries in France rapidly merged and concentrated and were taken over by 
multinational  groups  (figure  1).  The  level  of  production  and  trade  increased  steadily  during  this 
concentration  process,  foreign  trade  of  canned  tuna  being  narrowly  embedded  in  the  multinational 
corporate strategies (fish caught by French vessels and landed in a foreign country where some French 
companies have processing units or portfolio investments becomes a French export to this country and the 
processed fish that is shipped to France is accounted for an import). This evolution is well known in the 
theoretical  literature  of  international  trade  which  explains  the  high  level  of  intra-industry  trade  by 
increasing returns to scale (Brander and Krugman 1983), although the tuna trade in Europe is rather 
vertically segmented (exports of raw tuna, imports of canned tuna). IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 1. Number of canneries and trade in France since 1822 
(Guillotreau and Ferreira Dias, 2005) 
 
 
In the US, the canned tuna industry, developed at the beginning of the 20th century in California, had to 
face the ‘low-cost competition’ initiated in the 1970s by Japan and followed by Thailand an other Asian 
countries. It has been forced to move the bulk of its production either in the US territories of American 
Samoa and Puerto Rico, where minimum wages are lower than in US mainland, or to South East Asian 
suppliers: as a result, since 1979, 11 canneries based in the US and its overseas possessions have closed 
(Campling et al. 2007). 
 
Concentration and suspicion of market power for the canned yellowfin market 
Like many other old industries, the worldwide tuna market is now hold by a few big Multinational Firms 
(MNF) surrounded by a competitive fringe. On the basis of exhaustive data available in 2003, we have 
assessed the concentration degree of the sector. The market shares in quantity were estimated as follows: 
firstly, different sources (Oceanic Development et al. 2005, Campling et al. 2007, Globefish and Seafood 
International) were used to reconstitute the world industry structure (production by firms), and secondly, 
national and international production and trade statistics were collected and distributed proportionally 
among the firms in order to assess the concentration of regional markets. Finally, this world-covering 
estimate  was  cross-checked  and  found  consistent  with  partial  market  concentration  estimates  from 
professional sources and the grey literature. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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At  the  global  level,  the  processing  capacity  of  the  major  firms  is  tremendous  and  the  five  leaders 
concentrate  nearly  half  of  the  world  market  for  canned  tuna.  As  reported  previously,  this  important 
concentration level is due to the increasing returns to scale on all segments of the supply chain. Tuna is a 
migratory  species  and  fishing  for  it  requires  a  tremendous  amount  of  investment,  as  shown  by  the 
increasing size of purse-seiners around the world. The trading of tuna products, now dealing with big 
retailing chains and processors, also require large-scale operators. And this is the case too for canning for 
which globalisation has extended the size of markets, thus increasing the marketing and transportation 
costs. The induced  fixed costs  are  therefore large  enough  to  justify  mergers  and acquisitions  by  the 
leaders of the tuna industry so as they can reduce their average production costs and transfer the cost 
reduction down to the consumer. This global level of concentration must also be further analyzed at the 
regional level by considering separately EU and the USA, the two major canned tuna markets in the 
world. The results show that the concentration is greater in the USA, where the three leading companies 
hold 75% of the market in volume; in value, the market share of the ‘big three’ may rise up to 85%. But in 
Europe, even when considered globally, sales in volume on the canned tuna EU market are already highly 
concentrated (figure 2): the five leading companies (Trinity Alimentary, Star Kist, Isabel Garavilla, Salica 
Albacora and Jealsa) hold 50% of the market in volume and the ten leading companies 72%. 
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Figure 2. The European canned tuna oligopoly (cumulated sales by firms in tons, 2003) 
Source: own estimates from Eurostat, Oceanic Development 2005, Campling et al. 2007 
 
The reasons for such an oligopoly are twofold. First of all, the leading firm
i benefits from a preferential 
trade  regime  which  favours  both  the  re-imports  of  canned  tuna  processed  by  their  subsidiary  plants 
delocalised  in  African-Caribbean-Pacific  (ACP)  countries  and  using  raw  materials  supplied  by  the 
European fleets with which they may have investment relationships. Indeed, three specific trade rules 
protect the European industry: i) the compensatory allowance for tuna (CAT) guarantees a minimum 
revenue  to  the  fishing  companies  supplying  the  European-based  canning  industry  whatever  the 
international raw-tuna prices, ii) the common tariff protects European processing firms from global world 
competition with a 20.5 or 24% tariff rate on canned tuna, and iii) the EU preferential trade tariffs
ii, which 
includes a rule of origin imposing the use of raw materials supplied either by the beneficiary countries or 
by European producers (Campling et al. 2007, Mongruel 2002, Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). 
 
 IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 3. Gross margins of various European canned tuna supply chains. 
Source: our estimates after data by Ofimer-SECODIP, Eurostat, Orthongel and SPC-FFA. 
 
Secondly, the European processing firms have adopted product differentiation strategies based on their 
well-established national brands, and eventually developed special recipes to create captive consumer 
preferences. Although canned tuna is widely viewed as a basic commodity
iii, demand elasticities can be 
lower  for  domestic  products  than  for  imported  ones  (Babula  and  Corey  2005),  while  product 
differentiation can ensure price premiums (Payne 1994). The gross margins, estimated by the difference 
between the price of canned tuna and that of frozen tuna, are much higher for yellowfin-based products 
sold in France and in Italy than for skipjack-based products sold in the UK as well as in Spain (figure 3). 
Thus, the strong processing oligopoly in the European Union, even showing a monopoly position in some 
of  the  member  states,  has  certainly  imposed  yellowfin-based  differentiated  products  on  the  southern 
markets (“atun claro en escabeche”, “thon albacore au naturel”, tuna salads…) that may enjoy better 
pricing. In other words, if the concentration of the market is relatively high and the consumer’s preference 
for national products is stimulated by major brands’ reputation, the domestic industry is likely to exercise 
market power on either retailers or consumers. 
In  the  EU,  the  market  for  final  goods  is  assumed  to  be  segmented  between  the  Northern  European 
countries  consuming  low-priced  products  imported  from  Asia  (mainly  Thailand)  and  the  Southern 
countries (Italy, Spain) processing and importing yellowfin-based products sold on their domestic markets 
at higher prices, France being an intermediate market where both products are consumed. If the former 
market is supposedly competitive, there is more suspicion of market power exercised on the latter. The 
aim of the following part of the paper is to search for econometric evidence of this market power, based 
on the case of the French canned yellowfin market. 
 
 
3. A dynamic structural IO Model applied to the French canned yellowfin market 
The theoretical model and data 
A way of testing for market power is to look at price movements after a rotation and shift of the demand 
curve (Steen and Salvanes 1999, Jaffry et al. 2003), following a structural IO model. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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The demand side may be described by: 
  Q = D(P, Z; a) + e  (1) 
where Q is the quantity of canned tuna in brine consumed by French households in supermarkets mainly, 
P is the price of canned tuna in brine and Z is a vector of exogenous variables affecting demand (e.g. the 
price of canned minced tuna in oil, considered as a substitute price in spite of previous and strange 
findings showing the two products as complements; (S. Jaffry, and Brown, J., 2005) a is the vector of 
parameters to be estimated and e  is the error term.  
The supply side is assumed to run in a non-competitive market, hence price equals marginal cost plus a 
monopoly component: 
P = c(Q,W;b)-l ×h(Q,Z;a) + h         (2) 
where W  are exogenous variables  on  the supply  side (e.g.  factor  prices),  b   are  the  supply function 
parameters, and  h is the supply error.  Marginal cost is given by c(×) and  P + h(×)is marginal revenue. 
Therefore  P +l ×h(×) is marginal revenue as perceived by the firm. Under perfect competition, l = 0 
and price equals marginal cost. When l = 1 we face a perfect monopoly power, and when, 0 < l <1 
various oligopoly regimes apply.  
Two input variables were selected: the ex-vessel market price of frozen yellowfin (bigger than 4.5lbs) for 
canneries and the minimum wage in France (€/hour), the former because frozen tuna represents the major 
input of canneries, the latter because labour cost is also an important part of the cost. 
 The general empirical problem in all market structure studies is how to identify l . Bresnahan solved this 
by introducing variables that combine elements of both rotation and vertical shifts in the demand curve. 
This is done by formulating an interaction term between P and Z, i.e. changes in a substitute price affects 
both  the  position  and  the  slope  of  the  demand  curve.  To  provide  the  necessary  intuition  for  the 
identification principle used, we formulate the simplest version of the static linear BL model. Assuming 
both demand and marginal cost to be linear, the demand function (1) can be written as: 
Q = a0 + apP + aZZ + aPZPZ + e,  (3) 
 
With the monopoly component, the market equilibrium relation becomes: 
h
a a
l b b + 





+
- + =
Z
Q
W Q P
PZ P
W Q      (4) 
since MR = P + Q (aP + a PZZ) [ ].  
By treating a P and a PZ as known (by first estimating the demand equation), l is now identified. To see 
this, write Q
* = -Q (a P +aPZZ). There are two included endogenous variables, Q and Q
*, and there 
are two excluded exogenous variables Z and PZ in (4). Hence, l  is identified as the coefficient of Q
* 
based on the estimation of (4). The inclusion of the rotation variable PZ in the demand function is crucial 
for this result. The economic implication of including this rotation variable in the demand equation is that 
the demand function is not separable in Z. Lau shows that identification is possible as long as this is true, 
regardless of the functional form chosen.  
 
The product of interest is canned tuna in brine consumed by French households. Therefore, it has been 
necessary to collect both quantities (Q) and prices (PCBT) for this product. To represent the vector of 
exogenous variables in the demand equation we use the price of a complement product, namely the price IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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of  canned  minced  tuna  in  oil  (PCMT)  (Jaffry  and Brown, 2005).  Two cost  components  are  used  to 
formulate  marginal  costs;  the  price  of  frozen  yellowfin  tuna  imported  by  Italy  (+10)  (PYFIT)  and 
minimum interprofessional wage (SMIC). The data sample comprises from the first quarter of 1995 to the 
fourth quarter of 2006. 
 
Table 1 The list of variables used in the model 
    Order of 
integration 
(ADF) 
Lags 
QBRINE (Q)  Qty of canned tuna in brine consumed in France (t) - OFIMER  I(1)  3 
PCBT (P)  Price of canned tuna in brine (€/kg) - OFIMER  I(1)  3 
PCMT (Z)  Price of canned minced tuna (€/kg) - OFIMER  I(1)  0 
PZ  Rotation term (PCBTPCMT)  I(1)  0 
PYFIT (W1)  Price of frozen YFT+10 imported by Italy in €/kg   I(1)  0 
SMIC (W2)  Minimum wage in France (€/hour)  I(1)  3 
 
Empirical results 
Preliminary tests: integration and cointegration tests 
Before specifying the empirical model we test the variables integration order using Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). All the variables are I(1), that is, they are 
not stationary and contain one unit root (Table 1). In order to study the existence of a long-run 
equilibrium solution we test for cointegration using the multivariate cointegration test suggested 
by Johansen and Juselius (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990). 
We need to ensure the existence of a long-run solution in both the demand relation and the 
supply  function.  For  this  reason,  we  undertake  two  cointegration  tests:  one  for  the  demand 
function  and  one  for  the  supply  equation.  Therefore,  the  matrix  of  variables  in  (1),  Xt,  is 
composed of the variables Q, PCBT, PCMT and PCBTPCMT (i.e., the interaction term which is 
obtained by multiplying PCBT by PCMT) for the demand equation, and the variables Q, PCBT, 
PYFIT, SMIC and Q* for the supply relation. 
The cointegration tests allow us to conclude that there is clear evidence of cointegration in both 
equations.  The  results,  available  on  simple  request  to  authors,  indicate  one  cointegration 
relationship considering the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test. For the supply equation, 
the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test indicate two cointegration vectors. 
 
Separability tests 
Following Steen and Salvanes (1999), in order to identify l (i.e., the parameter which represents 
the degree of competition) we need the demand function not to be separable in the vector of 
exogenous variables in the demand equation. In order to identify rotation in the MR curve, one 
variable is enough. Then, our vector of exogenous variables is made up of one variable. This 
variable is the price of canned minced tuna in oil (PCMT). Therefore, we need the demand IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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function not to be separable  in PCMT so as to identify l. To test this hypothesis we utilise the 
exclusion tests in the Johansen-Juselius framework. 
Exclusion tests (Johansen and Juselius, 1990) analyse if the long-run parameter for PCBTPCMT 
(i.e., the interaction term) in the cointegration relationship, which has been found in the demand 
equation, is significantly different from zero. Then, the demand function is separable in PCMT if 
PCBTPCMT can be excluded from the long-run cointegration relationship or, in other words, we 
reject the null hypothesis of the test ( 0 : H PCBTPCMT , 1 0 = b ). 
The  result  is  shown  in  Table  2.  The  null  hypothesis  of  separability  is  rejected  at  a  5% 
significance  level.  Consequently,  the  demand  function  is  not  separable  in  PCMT  and  this 
interaction term, PCBTPCMT, can be used to identify l. 
Table 2. Separability test 
  Statistic 
H0: b1,PCBTPCMT=0  5.79037* 
Notes: * Significance at a 5% level, ** significance at a 10% level. 
 
 
The empirical model 
 
After performing the unit root, cointegration, weak exogeneity and separability tests, we proceed 
to estimate the demand equation: 
( ) t k t PCBTPCMT k t PCMT k t PCBT k t
1 n
0 i
i t i PCBTPCMT,
1 n
0 i
i t i PCMT,
1 n
0 i
i t i PCBT,
3
1 i
1 n
1 i
i t i Q, t i, iD 0 it
ε   PCBTPCMT     θ   PCMT   θ   PCBT   θ Q * η    ∆ΡCBTPCMT    α
  ∆PCMT α   ∆PCBT α   ∆Q α D τ α ∆Q
+ - - - + +
+ + + + =
- - - -
-
=
-
-
=
-
-
=
-
=
-
=
-
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (2) 
 
and the supply relation: 
( ) t
*
k t Q k t SMIC k t PYFIT k t PCBT k t
1 n
0 i
*
i i , Q
1 n
0 i
i t i ,    SMIC
1 n
0 i
i t i ,    PYFIT
1 n
0 i
i t i ,    Q
1 n
1 i
i t i ,    PCBT 0 it
υ Q Ω   SMIC     PYFIT     PCBT   Q * γ   ∆Q
  ∆SMIC     ∆PYFIT     ∆Q   PCBT ∆      ∆PCBT
* * + - d - d - d - + b +
b + b + b + b + b =
- - - - -
-
=
-
=
-
-
=
-
-
=
-
-
=
-
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
    (3) 
where  ( ) ( ) t PCBTPCMT PCBT t
*
t , in arg m PCMT Q Q q + q = . 
 
 
The demand function 
 
We will start presenting the results for the demand function (Equation (2)): 
 
( ) t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t t
t t t 3, t 2, t 1, it
ε PCMT 909.00PCBT - T 5230.14PCM T 4316.72PCB Q 0.66 - CMT PCBTP 375.22∆
MT PC 3429.32∆ BT PC 1611.01∆ 2782.74D 2545.17D 4253.49D 21574.10 ∆Q
+ + + -
+ + - + + =
- - - -
(4) 
R
2=0.97 
 
The model fits well because it has an R
2 of 0.97. The long-run parameters have the correct signs. 
Additionally, the model was tested for autocorrelation using the autocorrelation LM test up to IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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order 1. The statistic of this test is 0.041, which allows us to conclude that there is no presence of 
autocorrelation. 
The estimate of the adjustment parameter is -0.66. As Salvanes and Steen (1999) point out, this 
parameter is expected to be in the range of -1 to 0. If it were zero, there is no error correction. On 
the other hand, if it were one, a deviation from the long-run equilibrium path would be adjusted 
instantly. In Tables 6 and 7, the significance of the parameters is displayed. All the long-run 
parameters are significantly different from zero and most of the short-run coefficients are also 
significant.  
 
Table 3. Significance of long-run coefficients: exclusion tests (demand equation) 
Long-run parameters  Statistics 
qQ  6.83* 
qPCBT  5.89* 
qPCMT  5.29* 
qPCBTPCMT  5.79* 
Notes: * Significance at a 5% level, ** significance at a 10% level. 
 
 
Table 4. Significance of short-run coefficients (demand equation) 
Variable  Statistics 
a0  5.32* 
aPCBT,0  0.97 
aPCMT,0  1.46 
aPCBTPCMT,0  -1.10 
t1D  14.35* 
t2D  3.51* 
t3D  -3.82* 
h*  -5.31* 
Notes: * Significance at a 5% level, ** significance at a 10% level. 
 
Finally,  the  long-run  own-price  elasticity  has  been  computed  using  the  formula 
[ ] [ ] Q PCBT PCMT PCBTPCMT PCBT PCBT , PCBT × q + q = Î  and it is equal to -0.13. Therefore, it suggests that each 
1% increase in market price in canned tuna in brine would lead to a 0.13% decrease in their 
demand. In other words, a change in price can elicit a less-than-proportional change (in the 
opposite  direction)  in  the  quantity  of  sales.  Likewise,  the  cross-price  elasticity  has  been 
determined using the formula  [ ] [ ] Q PCMT PCBT PCBTPCMT PCMT PCMT , PCBT × q + q = Î  and it amounts to -0.57. 
As the cross price elasticity has a negative sign, it confirms that both products can be considered 
complements, which is amazingly in line with other estimations despite unclear interpretation 
(Jaffry and Brown 2005). 
 
The supply function 
In this case, considering the cointegration and weak exogeneity tests, it has not been possible to 
estimate a single equation. However, following Steen and Salvanes (1999), we have performed 
an exclusion test on the long-run coefficients of Q* in the two cointegration relationships. This 
test has allowed us to study the existence of market power. The null hypothesis of non-existence IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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of market power is  0 : H * Q , 2 * Q , 1 0 = b = b . The alternative hypothesis of existence of market power is 
0 : H * Q , 2 * Q , 1 1 ¹ b ¹ b . The c
2 statistic is 25.92. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% 
significance level and, consequently, there is evidence of market power.   
 
4. Discussion of the results and implications for the tuna fisheries and trade 
Although evidence of market power has been brought by the estimated Bresnahan-Lau model, it 
was not made possible to assess the extent to which market power is exercised by the canning or 
retailing  industry  upon  the  French  consumers.  Another  attempt  was  done  by  using  an  OLS 
estimation. Such estimation is allowed for I(1) variables as long as weak exogeneity can be 
found  for  most  of  the  variables  in  one  cointegration  relationship  (Susanto  2006).  In  our 
estimation the problem is that there were two cointegration relationships and Q was not found 
exogenous and this is valid “only when all right-hand variables in a single equation are weakly 
exogenous does the single-equation approach provide the same result as a multivariate equation 
approach” (Asteriou 2006, p. 342). If this condition was met for the demand equation, it was not 
the case for the supply equation.  
In other words, the canneries and retailers have perfectly transmitted the price drop to consumers 
of canned skipjack but our results show that it has not been the case for canned yellowfin in brine 
consumed in France (Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2007). The reason can either be found in the high 
degree of differentiation on the French market of canned tuna (private brands), or in the level of 
trade protection, through a 24% tariff paid by the Asian goods to enter the European markets. 
Because we used consumer prices and ex-vessel prices of tuna in our model, the increasing 
margin can be caused either by the processing industry or by the supermarket chains. It makes no 
doubt that part of the increasing returns to scale, hence concentration, of the last two decades in 
the  canning  sector  is  certainly  due  to  the  steady  growth  and  concentration  of  the  retailing 
industry, at least in the European Union. The big retailing chains (5 or 6 remaining ones in each 
country after many mergers and acquisitions) concentrate more than 80% of canned tuna sales in 
most  of  the  European  countries.  They  need  to  deal  with  strong  commercial  partners  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  to  follow  them  in  their  worldwide  expansion  (Walmart,  Carrefour, 
Tesco…).  
Along the value chain, not less than three concentrated middle stake-holders set their markups 
between the producers and the consumers (packers, traders, retailers). This problem is known in 
the  literature as the double-marginalization problem  (or  treble-marginalization in  the present 
case!).  The  final  product  price  paid  by  the  consumer  is  generally  higher  than  a  vertically-
integrated  monopolist  would  set  up.  The  common  solutions  for  double-marginalization  are 
vertical  integration  or  vertical  restraints  (Sherman  2008).  Regarding  the  vertical  integration 
solution, very rare are the cases where a retailer would accept to merge with a cannery, although 
it has occurred in the past. Indeed, we saw that sub-contracting practices have developed instead 
of the former vertical integration of packers. More commonplace are vertical restraints such as 
two-part pricing, franchising, profit-sharing through private labels and resale price maintenance. 
Private or own labels (of retailers) are known as providing for the retailer higher profit margins 
despite lower sale prices (Barsky et al. 2001). “The consequence of the strategic effect is that not 
only  will  the  mark-up  on  own  label  products  be  higher  as  a  direct  consequence  of  retailer 
bargaining power with own-label manufacturers but it will also serve to shift rent from national 
brand manufacturers” (Mac Corriston 2002). On the French seafood market for canned fish, the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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market share of retailers’ private labels was estimated around 32.8% (in value) in 2007 and it has 
not changed since 2000 (source AC Nielsen). In Spain, the market share for canned tuna is 
greater,  around  54%  (source  Alimarket),  and  can  reach  higher  proportions  for  some  market 
segments (59% for canned yellowfin in vegetal oil or 70% for canned skipjack) (source: IRI 
España, in Alimarket February 2008). This strong trend reinforces the idea of market power that 
is not necessarily exercised through unit margins and may hit as well the manufacturers’ brands. 
The  so-called  “Backward  margins”  (marketing  services  charged  by  supermarkets  to  the 
manufacturers) may represent half of the final price paid by the consumer. Such practices are not 
really  testable  through  a  price  analysis,  though  representing  high  levels  of  profits  for  the 
superstore chains. 
The consequences for the tuna fisheries are really detrimental because the large-scale industries 
down the chain impose increasing returns to scale up the chain through ever bigger and more 
efficient purse-seiners. As a result, both consumer and producers surplus are captured by the high 
processing and retailing mark-ups. The globalisation of markets through the global strategies of 
multinational firms fishing and processing tuna in low-cost countries has undoubtedly “trapped” 
the fisheries into this welfare-reducing trade, increasing the fishing effort to meet the volume 
requirements  of  the  canning  industry  and  squeezing  the  consumer  surplus  of  the  northern 
markets. The fully –if not over- exploited stocks of tuna in the three major oceans along with the 
increasing fuel price should address new questions to this economic model and may hopefully 
encourage the development of new and more sustainable value chains for tuna products. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i Including the American Starkist (ex-property of Heinz prior its sale to Del Monte Foods in 2006 and to the Korean 
group Dongwon in 2008) which used to own, until 2006, the French brand “Petit Navire” since 1978 and shares of 
other processing plants in the Seychelles since 1987 and in Ghana since 1994. Since 2006, these two important 
canneries in the Seychelles (IOT) and Ghana (PFC) are owned by the US investment bank Lehman Brothers. 
ii Complete suspension of trade tariffs is offered to some developing countries under the EU-ACP agreements and 
the ‘GSP Plus’ tariff system, which is a sub-system of the Generalised System of Preferences in particular available 
to Andean and Central American countries in order to help them in fighting against the production of illicit drugs. 
iii Indeed, in most markets, canned tuna is considered as a rather low-valued product, being subject to possible 
substitution effects (Babula and Corey 2005). 